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Douglas: Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB

LINDEN LUMBER DIVISION, SUMMER & CO. v. NLRB
employer may refuse to recognize a union which
claims majority status based on signed authorizationcards without filing a §9(c)(1)(B) petitionfor an NLRB conducted election.
- U.S. -, 95 S.Ct. 429 (1974).
LABOR LAW-an

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRBI signifies the beginning of
a new stage2 in the development of the forty year old National
Labor Relations Act. 3 The Court held that in the absence of unfair
labor practices,4 an employer when presented with union authorization cards5 purported to be signed by a majority of his employees, has neither a duty to bargain6 with the designated union 7 nor
1. U.S. 95 S. Ct. 429 (1974) (5-4 decision).
2. There have been a number of fairly distinct stages in the development of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended [hereinafter the Act]:
(a) In 1935 Congress passed the original National Labor Relations Act also known
as the Wagner Act [hereinafter Wagner Act], ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), which established the rights of labor organizations;
(b) the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 popularly known as the TaftHartley Act [hereinafter Taft-Hartley Act], ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), amended the
Wagner Act; and
(c) the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 which became
known as the Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), amended the
Taft-Hartley Act.
Each of these three stages-1935-47, 1947-59, and 1959-present-identifies a fairly
distinct period in the evolution of the nation's labor laws. A theme of this article is that
the Linden case signifies a preview of the next period, during which some of the administrative wrinkles of the Act which have surfaced in recent years will be subjected to remedial treatment. Admittedly, Linden should not be viewed as the actual start of a new
segment in the labor history of this nation; however, as will be developed subsequently,
a careful reading of the Supreme Court's decision suggests several major issues which
Congress and the Board will have to address during the coming years.
3. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1970).
4. Unfair labor practices are enumerated in Section 8 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158
(1970); these violations defeat the intentions of the Act and therefore subject the violator
to the sanctions at the disposal of the National Labor Relations Board [hereinafter the
Board] as provided in Section 10 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
5. Authorization cards are forms printed by a union which provide an employee with
an opportunity to indicate, by signing, that the union is designated to represent the
employee for purposes of collective bargaining and/or that the employee requests that a
Board-conducted election be held to determine the representation question. If a union
presents the Board with valid authorization cards for at least 30% of the employees in an
appropriate unit, this substantial showing of employee interest will provide the basis for
a Board-conducted election. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (1974). See also West Virginia Pulp
& Paper Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 309, 312 (1946).
6. N.L.R.A. §8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970) provides:
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a duty to activate the National Labor Relations Board's election
machinery.8 The five to four division of the Court, 9 the lengthy
delays in the disposition of this issue,"' and the vacillation by the
Board in its policy on the substantive issue" suggest a need for
Congress and the Board to refine the administration of the nation's labor-management policy.' 2 Accordingly, in analyzing the

Linden decision it will be necessary to examine not only the specific legal issue decided by the Court, but also to consider the
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
7. N.L.R.A. § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment. . . .(emphasis added).
8. N.L.R.A. § 9(c)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (1970) states:
(c)(1) Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such
regulations as may be prescribed by the Board(B) by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or labor organizations have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the representative
defined in subsection (a) of this section; the Board shall investigate such petition...
9. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by Mr. Chief
Justice Burger, Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist.
Mr. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice
Marshall, and Mr. Justice Powell joined.
It is appropriate to note at this point that NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575
(1969), which was the forerunner of this case, was a unanimous decision. See text accompanying notes 42-53 infra. Therefore, an issue which warrants consideration is whether the
sudden division of the Court on an issue that appeared somewhat settled as a matter of
law antedates a firm resolution of the entire matter. See text accompanying notes 66.69
infra.
10. The median time for securing a ruling on an unfair labor practice charge is 388
days. In Linden the delay was 42 years and in Wilder, the companion case, the time
elapsed was 6% years. U.S. _
_., 95 S. Ct. 429, 432 (1974).
11. In Truck Drivers Union Local No. 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099, 1103 (D.C. Cir.
1973), rev'd sub nom. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, -U.S.
-,
95
S. Ct. 429 (1974), the Court of Appeals observed that:
[a]fter over 7 years, and three Board decisions representing a series of reversals
in position, the Board now seeks to limit sharply the scope of any duty to bargain
on the basis of any authorization cards.
12. The primary purpose of the Act is to achieve industrial peace. See Koenig, The
N.L.R.A.-An Appraisal, 23 CoRnu L. Q. 392, 422-23 (1938). Therefore, judicial uncertainty coupled with delays in disposing of unfair labor practices and unsettled Board
policies defeat the Act's fundamental objective.
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administrative implications inherent in the Court's ruling.
The Supreme Court disposed of two similar cases in the
Linden decision.'" In Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co.,
the union presented the employer with authorization cards signed
by a majority of its employees and demanded recognition for the
purposes of collective bargaining. Linden refused this demand,
expressed doubt concerning the union's majority status, and suggested that the union file a 9(c)(1)(A) petition with the Board for
an election." The union did file such a petition, but withdrew it's

when the employer refused to agree to a consent election 6 and
indicated an unwillingness to abide by any election on the ground

that supervisors assisted the union's organizational drive.' 7 The
union subsequently struck for recognition and then filed an unfair
13. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718 (1971); Wilder Mfg. Co.,
198 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 81 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1972).
14. N.L.R.A. § 9(c)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A) (1970) states:
(c)(1) Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such
regulations as may be prescribed by the Board(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor
organization acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number of employees (i) wish to be represented for collective bargaining and that their employer
declines to recognize their representative as the representative defined in Section (a) of this section; the Board shall investigate such petition ....
15. The apparent reason for the union withdrawing the 9(c)(1)(A) petition was to
hasten the resolution of the representation question. Had the union permitted the employer to litigate his defense-that company supervisors improperly aided the union's
organizational efforts-the best remedy the union could obtain would be a finding that
supervisors did not assist the union. The Board would then most likely order an election
which could be held one year after the original election petition was fied. From a tactical
standpoint the union would be at a definite disadvantage because it would be most
difficult to maintain employee interest in the union for such an extended period of time.
16. 29 C.F.R. § 101.19 (1974) states:
The Board has devised and makes available to the parties two types of
informal consent procedures through which representation issues can be resolved without recourse to formal procedures. These informal arrangements are
commonly referred to as consent-election agreement, followed by regional director's determination, and consent-election agreement, followed by Board certification. .

.

. (emphasis added)

These provisions avoid formal procedures because the parties agree with respect to
the appropriate unit, the payroll period to be used as the basis of eligibility to vote, and
the place, date, and hours of balloting. Therefore, an election can be conducted much
sooner than if the formal provision of 29 C.F.R. § 101.20 (1974) was used. For a more
detailed explanation of the consent elections provisions see 29 C.F.R. § 101.19 (a) & (b).
17. See generally Comment, The Role of Supervisors in Employee Unions, 40 U. Cm.
L. REv. 185 (1972) (discussion of the ambiguous role of the supervisor and the special
treatment accorded supervisors under the Act).
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labor practice charge against Linden based on its refusal to bargain.
In Wilder Mfg. Co., the union requested recognition based on
signed authorization cards from a majority of the employees in
the production *and maintenance unit. The employer failed to
respond and recognitional picketing began. The union filed an
unfair labor practice charge against Wilder because of its refusal
8
to bargain.'
The unions argued before the Board that the employers had
a duty to bargain because the authorization cards when coupled
with the recognitional strike and recognitional picketing provided
convincing evidence of majority support. The General Counsel of
the Board contended on behalf of the companies that there was
no employer duty to bargain in the absence of either unfair labor
practices or any agreement to determine majority status through
means other than a Board-conducted election. In each case the
Board held that the employer's refusal to bargain did not constitute an unfair labor practice.' 9 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed both cases on review 2 but was itself
2
reversed by the Supreme Court. '
In order to scrutinize the Court's reasoning, it is necessary to
discern the rationale for the passage of the statutory provisions
on which the Court relied,' 2 as well as to trace the development
of the relevant case law. After this information is presented it will
be possible to project the impact that the Linden decision will
have on the nation's labor law.
In 1947 the Wagner Act was amended to permit an employer
18. The union in Wilder also filed additional unfair labor practice charges which are
not germane to the instant case. Truck Drivers Union Local No. 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d
1099, 1100-03, (D.C. Cir. 1973); rev'd sub nom. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v.
NLRB,

-

U.S. _,

95 S. Ct. 429 (1974).

19. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718 (1971); Wilder Mfg. Co.,
198 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 81 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1972).
20. Truck Drivers Union Local No. 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
21. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, U.S. -,
95 S. Ct. 429
(1974).
22. The Linden case is interesting because the appellate courts viewed the issue in
different ways: the court of appeals based its reversal on a determination that 9(c)(1)(B)
created an employer duty to file a petition; the majority of the Supreme Court reversed
this holding by concluding that the legislative history indicated that this section was not
intended to create such a duty; and, although the dissent agreed with the majority finding
as to 9(c)(1)(B), it reasoned that Sections 8(a)(5) and 9(a) required that the union position
be sustained. See text accompanying notes 54-60 infra.
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to petition the Board to conduct an election. 3 This was done in
order to give an employer recourse when a union presented a
demand for recognition. It is useful to repeat the oft-quoted remarks2 of Senator Taft which capture the employer's dilemma as
it was perceived during the 1947 Congressional debates on the
amendments to the Wagner Act.25 Senator Taft
Taft-Hartley
26
stated:
Today an employer is faced with this situation. A man
comes into his office and says, "I represent your employees. Sign
this agreement, or we strike tomorrow." Such instances have
occurred all over the United States. The employer has no way
in which to determine whether this man really does represent his
employees or does not. The bill gives him the right to go to the
Board under those circumstances, and say "I want to know who
is the bargaining agent for my employees." (emphasis added).
Although it is difficult to isolate the precise Congressional intent
for the enactment of a statute from debates in the Senate, it
appears from the statements made prior to the approval of the
Section 9(c)(1)(B) amendment that the legislators viewed the
changes regarding the actual filing of a petition for an election as
establishing a right for employers, rather than a duty. Several
factors account for the passage of 9(c)(1)(B) in its final form: the
realization that the Wagner Act did not provide an adequate
means for ancemployer to deal with the dilemma which Senator
Taft identified; 21 the Congressional desire to treat employers and
23. See note 8 supra.
24. See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB,

-

U.S. -

_

95 S.

Ct. 429, 433 (1974); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 599-600 n.16 (1969); Truck
Drivers Union Local No. 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099, 1110 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
25. In analyzing the legislative history of the relevant statutory provisions, the ambit
of the inquiry will be restricted to Section 9(c)(1)(B) which deals with the employer
petition for an election. Although the dissent in Linden relied upon Sections 8(a)(5) and
9(a) of the Act to conclude that Congress actually intended to impose a duty on employers,
this writer feels that the Congressional intent as to whether an employer has a duty or a
right to file a 9(c) petition is properly resolved by an examination of that specific section
rather than by following the troublesome approach of the dissent which widened the scope
of the inquiry to additional sections whose application is far broader. See generally Cox,
The Duty to Bargainin Good Faith,71 HARV. L. Rav. 1401 (1958). Cf. text accompanying
notes 59-60 infra.
26. 93 CONG. REc. 3838 (1947).
27. 93 CONG. REc. 4904 (1947) (remarks of Senator Murray):
We also concur in so much of the proposed amendment contained in section
9(c)(1) which would permit employers to request certification of bargaining
representatives whenever an unrecognized union claims the right to represent
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employees equally; 2s and the need to limit an employer's strategic
utilization of the election petition to quash a union's organizational efforts.29 The Congressional debates, therefore, do not suggest that the final statutory enactment was intended to create an
employer's duty to file such a petition.
It is also useful to examine the extensive case law on this
subject in order to determine the employer's legal responsibilities
with respect to the presentation of authorization cards prior to
Linden.30 The 1944 Supreme Court decision in Franks Bros. Co.
v. NLRB 3' indicated that the Board could order an employer who
violated Section 8(a)(5)32 to bargain with a union designated by
a majority of employees as their bargaining agent through the use
of authorization cards, even though prior to Board action a
change in the members of the work force through normal attrition
resulted in a loss of the union's majority status. This loss of majority support was due to the fact that seven months elapsed
between the filing of the unfair labor practice charge and the
issuance of a complaint by the Board. 3 The Court, in disposing
of the case, approved the Board's contention that ". . . a requirement that union membership be kept intact during delays inciemployees-or whenever the employer is confronted by competing unions both
seeking the right to represent the same employees. (emphasis added).
28. See 93 CONG. REc. 5014 (1947) (remarks of Senator Ball):
A few additional rights are given to employers. I think that is done on the
basis that if a free economy and a free enterprise system are to be maintained,

employers as well as employees must be entitled to the same rights and to equal
justice under the law. One such right is the right to petition the National Labor
Relations Board for an election to determine the bargaining representative of an
employer's workers, whenever one or more unions present to the employers a

demand for recognition as representing the employees. .

.

.I think the em-

ployer is also entitled to know, through the secret ballot provided by the bill,
whether the union really represents and is the choice of-the majority of his
employees. (emphasis added).
29. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1947). The report recognized that:

.. .if an employer could petition at any time, he could effectively frustrate the
desire of his employees to organize by asking for an election on the first day that
a union organizer distributed leaflets at his plant.

30. Since the Court includes recognitional picketing and the organizational strike in
conjunction with its discussion of authorization cards, these two union tactics may also
be analyzed as if they were authorization cards in terms of their reliability. See Linden
Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, - U.S.
95 S. Ct. 429, 482 (1974).
31. 321 U.S. 702 (1944).
32. See note 6 supra.

33. For the impact of delay on a union trying to maintain its majority status, see
Comment, 39 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 314, 326 (1972).
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dent to hearings would result in permitting employers to profit
from their own wrongful refusal to bargain. . .. -"I Consequently,
majority status could be established by the use of authorization
cards and without a Board-conducted election.
Yet the Board and the courts recognized that an employer
could have a "good faith doubt" about the view of his employees
with respect to unionism or a particular union after having been
presented with purportedly valid authorization cards. Thus, Joy
Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB3 established as permissible behavior
within the meaning of the Act, an employer's right to refuse to
bargain with a union so long as the employer substantiated his
reason for having such doubt. 6 Since the burden rested on the
employer to prove his claim of doubt, if he failed to satisfy this
requirement the Board could infer bad faith and issue a bargaining order. The Board could also prove bad faith if the employer
committed unfair labor practices, aside from refusing to bargain, 37 since the Board could view the claim of "doubt" merely
as a pretext by the employer to gain time to persuade the employees to support his anti-union position. Under this policy the
Board became enmeshed in the time consuming task of investigating employer intent and then had the ultimate burden of determining whether good faith existed.
The Board gradually revised its policy over the next fifteen
years and formally clarified these changes in Aaron Brothers.3 1 In
that case the union relied on authorization cards to substantiate
its demand for recognition and the employer violated the Act by
committing unfair labor practices. In explaining its position the
39
Board recognized that:
[w]hile an employer's right to a Board election is not absolute, it has long been established Board policy that an employer
may refuse to bargain and insist upon such an election as proof
of a union's majority unless its refusal and insistence were not
34. Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 704 (1944).
35. 185 F.2d 732 (1950), enforcing 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949).
36. For example, improperly worded cards could be used as a basis for employer
doubt. See Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963), enforced, 351 F.2d 917 (6th
Cir. 1965). See generally Comment, Union Authorization Cards, 75 YAIm L. J. 805 (1966).
37. For an extensive discussion of other unfair labor practices see Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in RepresentationElections Under the NationalLaborRelations
Act, 78 HAnv. L. Rlv. 38, 66-123 (1964).
38. 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966).
39. Id. at 1078.
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made with a good-faith doubt of the union's majority. An election by secret ballot is normally a more satisfactory means of
determining employees' wishes, although authorization cards
signed by a majority may also evidence their desires. Absent an
affirmative showing of bad faith, an employer, presented with
a majority card showing and a bargaining request, will not be
held to have violated his bargaining obligation under the law
simply because he refuses to rely upon cards, rather than an
election, as the method for determining the union's majority.
(footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
Aaron Brothers clearly overruled Joy Silk. The Board shifted
the burden of proving bad faith from the employer to the union.
Thus, if the union failed to establish bad faith, no bargaining
order would issue.4" Moreover, the union now had to show that an
unfair labor practice committed by an employer had the effect of
jeopardizing the majority status of the union in order for such
conduct to constitute grounds for a bargaining order remedy. Although unfair labor practice violations no longer meant, a fortiori,
that bad faith existed, 41 serious infractions still provided a basis
for the issuance of a bargaining order. Aaron Brothers also acknowledged that the reliability of cards was inferior to elections.
The next important ruling in this line of decisions was NLRB
v. Gissel Packing Co. 42 In Gissel the following events transpired:
the union solicited authorization cards from a majority of employees in an appropriate unit; it demanded recognition from the
employer as the bargaining agent; the employer refused the union
request; and he then committed unfair labor practices. The employer contended in defending his position that authorization
cards were, as a general rule, not only inferior to elections but
were so inherently unreliable as evidence of employee sentiment
that they should never be used to create an employer duty to
bargain with a union.4 3 In support of this argument, the employer
40. Id. at 1079.
41. See Hammond & Irving, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 1071, 1073 (1965).
42. 395 U.S. 575 (1969). It should be noted that in Gissel four similar cases were
combined by the Court; for the purposes of this analysis they will be treated as one.
43. The following steps represent the reasoning in support of this position: (a) Section
9(a) of the Act authorizes a union designated by a majority of employees in an appropriate
unit to be the exclusive representative; (see note 7 supra); (b) the standard used to
demonstrate majority status is "convincing evidence of majority support" (see NLRB v.
Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 112 F.2d 756, 757 (2d Cir. 1940); (c) if cards are inherently
unreliable then they cannot be convincing evidence; and (d) a fortiori the employer prevails. Cf. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 585-86 (1969).
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claimed that cards were gathered without management having
had a chance" to campaign effectively against the union 5 and
were often obtained by the use of fraud and coercion.' Therefore,
the purported expression of employee choice was always made
while the employees were uninformed of the company's position
and as a result such a designation must be declared invalid. 7
44. An employer, in support of this contention, might advance the argument that at
least the chance to campaign against a union should exist regardless of the extent of prounion employee sentiment by analogizing to the line of cases in the corporate law area
which hold that the members of a Board of Directors of a corporation can exercise their
authority only when they convene as a Board. The rationale for this traditional requirement is that a minority director must have an opportunity to persuade the majority
members of the Board of Directors-which is a deliberative body-to adopt an alternate
position. Similarly, since Section 7 of the Act accords employees the rights to join as well
as to refrain from joining labor organizations and since Section 9(b) of the Act refers to
an appropriate unit rather than to individual employees, a fundamental orientation of the
statute is for employees to function as an entity in the same sense that a Board of Directors
of a corporation is to act as a unit. Accordingly, a determination of majority status is not
appropriate until all employees and the employer, who is certainly an interested and
legitimate party to this determination (see, e.g., Section 8(c)), have an opportunity to
persuade all employees to adopt a particular position.
See H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINEss
ENTERPRISES § 208 (2d ed. 1970). Compare Baldwin v. Canfield, 26 Minn. 43, 1 N.W. 261
(1879) with In re B-F Building Corp., 284 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1960). But see Kessler,
The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors:A CorporateAnachronism, 27 U. CHI.
L. REv. 696, 701 (1960).
45. Normally, a union will formally notify an employer of an organizational effort in
order to subject the employer to the unfair labor practice provisions of the Act. The reason
for notification is to establish the causation element of an employer's violations, namely,
that the employer specifically acted in contravention of the employees' Section 7 rights
in order to defeat the union. The union will sometimes delay the formal notification if it
feels the element of surprise will aid it strategically. See Comment, Union Authorization
Cards: A Reliable Basis for an NLRB Order to Bargain, 47 TEx. L. Rxv. 87, 91 (1968). Cf.
N.L.R.A. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) which states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
46. See Dixie Cup Div. of Am. Can Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 167 (1966).
47. For an example of this type of problem see Levi Strauss & Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 732
(1968).
This contention can be better understood by placing it within the context of the
"informed consent doctrine," which provides that an exchange of all relevant information
is a condition precedent to a grant of authority from one party to another. The reason for
this needed dialogue is that a transfer of power must be done with a full appreciation of
the consequences and therefore in its absence the grant is uninformed and invalid. This
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The Court in Gissel summarized the position of the Board on
"
the issue in the following way:48
•

. .

a company could not be ordered to bargain unless (1) there

was no question aboit a Union's majority status (either because
the employer agreed the cards were valid or had conducted his
own poll so indicating), or (2)the employer's §§ 8(a)(1) and (3)
unfair labor practices committed during the representation
campaign were so extensive and pervasive that a bargaining
order was the only available Board remedy irrespective of a card
majority.
The "independent knowledge" exception could arise if the employer conducted a poll49 or agreed to have a neutral person ascertain the desires of the employees." Where additional sources confirmed the reliability of the cards the evidence would be convincing, thus preventing the employer from questioning the reliability
of the cards." The second exception was based on necessity since
if unfair labor practices precluded the holding of a fair election,
cards provided the best substitute. 2 The Court limited its holding
to the second exception because the fact pattern in Gissel inanalogy is especially accurate when it is applied to a union-employee relationship since
the union acts as the agent of the employees. For a discussion of informed consent as it
pertains to the doctor-patient relationship see Note, Restructuring Informed Consent:
Legal Therapy for the Doctor-PatientRelationship, 79 YALE L. J. 1533 (1970).
48. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 586 (1969).
49. The rules regarding polling are enumerated in Struksnes Construction Co., 165
N.L.R.B. 1062, 1063 (1967):
Absent unusual circumstances, the polling of employees by an employer
will be violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act unless the following safeguards are
observed: (1) the purpose of the poll is to determine the truth of a union's claim
of majority, (2) this purpose is communicated to the employees, (3) assurances
against reprisals are given, (4) the employees are polled by secret ballot, and
(5) the employer has not engaged in unfair labor practices or otherwise created
a coercive atmosphere.
50. See Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966).
51. At oral argument in Gissel the Board confirmed that the employer's good faith
doubt was largely irrelevant and that the controlling factor regarding an order to bargain
was whether an election could be held. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 594
(1969). This is somewhat paradoxical since an absence of knowledge-doubt-was
deemed to be irrelevant while knowledge when classified as "independent knowledge" was
the basis for an order to bargain.
52. Cf. Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1079 n.10 (1966) wherein the Board stated:
[w]here an employer has engaged in unfair labor practices, the results of a
Board-conducted election are a less reliable indication of the true desires of
employees than authorization cards, whereas, in a situation free of such unlawful interference, the converse is true.
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volved employer unfair labor practices. 3 Therefore, after Gissel,
if an employer had committed serious unfair labor practices the
Board could issue a bargaining order based on valid authorization
cards obtained from a majority of employees in an appropriate
unit. The holding did not extend to situations where no unfair
labor practices were present, nor did the decision rule on the
reliability issue. Accordingly, the Board's policy as enunciated in
Aaron Brothers remained intact.
Linden provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to
review the Board's approach with respect to authorization cards
when an employer committed no unfair labor practices. The majority held that an employer does not have a duty to file a
9(c)(1)(B) petition for an election54 when he is presented with a
union demand for recognition based on authorization cards. In
dismissing the main thrust of the Court of Appeals' position that
the legislative intent of 9(c)(1)(B) was to place the burden on an
employer to petition for an election, the majority concluded that
the legislative history of that provision clearly indicated a Congressional intent merely to accord employers the right to petition
for a Board-conducted election. The Court recognized that if the
employer did not have to petition for an election then the union
would have two options: to file a 9(c)(1) (A) petition for an election55 which is a comparatively speedy mechanism"6 or to file an
8(a) (5) unfair labor practice charge which is frequently subject to
protracted delays." In dealing with the first option, the Court
clearly placed the burden on the union to file a 9(c)(1)(A) petition
53. 395 U.S. 575, 612 n.18 (1969).
54. A Section 9(c)(1)(B) petition can be filed by an employer only after a union
claims that it represents a majority of employees in an appropriate unit. See, e.g., Amperex Electronic Corp., 109 N.L.R.B. 353, 354 (1954).
55. By winning a Board-conducted election and becoming certified, a union is accorded several significant statutory benefits: Section 8(b)(4)(C) prohibits recognitional
strikes and concerted activities by any individual; Section 8(b)(7)(B) prohibits recognitional and organizational picketing by a rival labor organization; and Section 9(c)(3)
guarantees the union a twelve month grace period for the union to establish itself in the
bargaining unit during which time no other union can petition for an election. In evaluating whether to petition for an election at the outset, a union must assess its chances of
winning and thereby gaining these benefits with the possibility of losing and thereby being
barred for one year under Section 9(c)(3) from another opportunity to be certified in the
same unit.
56. [The median time between the filing of the petition for an election and the
decision of the regional director is about 45 days. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v.
NLRB,

__

U.S. _,

95 S. Ct. 429, 432 (1974).

57. See note 10 supra.
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if it wanted to invoke the Board's election machinery. As for the
8(a)(5) approach, the Court found that although cards may be
reliable,', because of the difficulty of making such a determination, the Board in some instances could in its discretion abolish
the entire refusal to bargain alternative. 5
The dissent, however, argued that: Section 8(a)(5) requires
an employer to bargain with the representative of his employees
as determined pursuant to Section 9(a); Section 9(a) permits
employees to designate a union; the Board has consistently applied the standard of "convincing evidence of majority support"
in making this determination; and, the legislative history of Section 9(a) indicated that Congress approved of the authorization
card method."9 Thus, the dissent found that the statutory provisions when taken as a whole required an employer to bargain with
a union designated by authorization cards.'
The majority opinion, therefore, is most interesting not for
what it said, but for what it left unsaid. The majority specifically
refrained from dealing directly with the grounds upon which the
four dissenting Justices relied. It could have said that in its discretion 2 the Board has found that cards are inherently unreliable
and therefore cannot provide "convincing evidence of majority
support." It would therefore follow that a union could not be
58. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, - U.S. -,
-,
95 S. Ct.
429, 432 (1974) (the Court raises the reliability deficiencies of various union tactics).
59. Therefore, the Gissel exceptions still hold. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
60. Since existing law at that time as determined by the Board recognized cards for
purposes of designating unions, one could argue by implication that Congress intended
for cards to be honored subsequently. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, U.S. , 95 S. Ct. 429, 435 (1974).
61. It should be pointed out that a proposal which would have eliminated the use of
cards was defeated.
62. Since the Act is silent regarding authorization cards, one could argue that such a
"gap" in the law was intended to be resolved by the administrative agency (the Board)
which could adopt the proper approach based on its experience and expertise. Had Congress intended to require the Board to always accord cards the same status of a Boardconducted election in terms of the duty to bargain, it could have so specified. In fact, the
Congressional desire to base representation on majority rule, as specified in Section 7,
necessitates that "designations" be by a true majority with the determination being
within the Board's jurisdiction.
Cf. National Petroleum Rfiners Ass'n v. F.T.C., 482 F.2d 672, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 751 (1974) wherein the court stated:
In determining the legislative intent, our duty is to favor an interpretation
which would render the statutory design effective to terms of the policies behind
its enactment and to avoid an interpretation which would make such policies
more difficult of fulfillment, particularly where, as here, that interpretation is
consistent with the plain language of the statute (citation omitted).
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designated through reliance on them and an employer would have
no duty to bargain with a union designated in such a manner. The
Court could have further strengthened this argument by analogizing to the political process where petitions are used to place a
candidate's name on the ballot,13 and insist that the use of authorization cards be limited solely to demonstrate a showing of
interest for purposes of placing a union's name on the ballot.64
Moreover, cards should not normally constitute a substitute for
an election,65 just as petitions signed by a majority of constituents
in an election district would not obviate the need for a formal
general election.
What happened in Linden is indicative of a major problem
that exists in the administration of the nation's labor law. Because policies are unsettled, practitioners must examine a surfeit
of case law in order to try to predict how current behavior will be
judged when it is ultimately litigated.6 7 Therefore, the reluctance
of the majority in Linden to identify specifically the Board's policy on the reliability of authorization cards may have been due
to either the uncertainty of that policy or the Board's history of
reversing itself.6"
Yet there is a solution for this problem. The Board should
utilize its rule making power69 and conduct hearings on the reliability of various methods used to demonstrate majority support.
Unions, employer associations, and Board field personnel could
formally provide data and suggestions on the merits of the proper
approach to pursue in the absence ofla precise provision in the
63. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 432 (1971).
64. See note 5 supra.
65. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
66. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) where the Court stressed the high
priority the right to vote is accorded:
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the
election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.
Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.
See generally, Samoff, NLRB Elections: Uncertainty and Certainty, 117 U. PA. L. REv.
228 (1968).
67. See notes 10-11 supra.
68. See note 11 supra.
69. N.L.R.A. § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1970) provides:
The Board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and
rescind, in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
subehapter.
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Act itself. The Board would then presumably have complete information on the subject and could issue a formal ruling complete
with clear standards to guide subsequent conduct by the parties.7'
In this way the uncertainty that survives as a result of the Linden
decision, which left the reliability issue unclear, could be elimi7
nated. '

At the outset of this analysis," an 4rgument was advanced
that Linden, when read closely, provides an indication of the
future focus of labor law. Linden exemplifies three things: the
Court's division on how to interpret provisions of the labor law
as shown by the five-four split; the lengthy delays in processing
cases; and the Board's constantly changing position on substantive issues. Were the Board to adopt rule making as a method of
clarifying its policies, these problems would be solved. During the
coming years the Board must apply its energies in this direction
if the Act's machinery is to function efficiently.
Robert L. Douglas
70. See Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 496-97 (2d
Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.) wherein the court stated:
: * *the argument for rule-making is especially strong when the Board is propos.
ing to reverse a long standing and oft-repeated policy on which industry and
labor have relied. (footnote omitted).
71. For extensive discussions of this issue which is beyond the scope of the present
analysis, see Kahn, The N.L.R.B. and Higher Education: The Failure of Policymaking
Through Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 63 (1973); Bernstein, The NLRB's
Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative ProcedureAct, 79 YALE
L. J. 571 (1970); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development
of Administrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. Rhv. 921 (1965).

72. See note 2 supra.
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